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INTRODUCTION 
In dividing the federal government into three parts, the Constitution gives 
each branch tools “to resist encroachments of the others.”1  One of Congress’s 
most potent strengths, particularly with respect to the executive branch, lies in 
its control over the money of the federal government.  Article I, Section 8 
begins its enumeration of the powers delegated to Congress with the “Power 
To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and excises”;2 it follows immediately 
with the power “To borrow money on the credit of the United States.”3  Article 
I, Section 9 commands that “No money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but 
in Consequence of Appropriations made by law.”4  Article I, Section 7 
prescribes the exclusive process for making a law, which commences with 
positive action by both Houses of Congress.5  Thus, unless Congress passes 
laws to impose taxes, authorizes borrowing or appropriates funds, the 
executive branch can neither take money from the citizenry nor spend money 
on behalf of the government. 
Supplementing the constitutional requirements, statutory provisions further 
undergird Congress’s control over the money of the federal government.  They 
require that appropriated funds be used for their stated purposes,6 that 
government agents not spend or encumber more funds than appropriated (the 
Antideficiency Act),7 and that agents of the government receiving funds from 
outside sources turn them over to the Treasury’s general fund and not retain 
 
* Professor of Law and Maurice Poch Faculty Research Scholar, Boston University 
School of Law.  Many thanks to my research assistant, April Xin, for her help. 
1 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 349 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
2 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
3 Id. § 8, cl. 2. 
4 Id. § 9, cl. 7. 
5 Id. § 7. 
6 31 U.S.C. § 1301(a) (2000). 
7 Id. § 1341. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1364032
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them for agency use (the Miscellaneous Receipts Act).8 
Virtually every federal government action requires an expenditure of funds 
and a consequent need to obtain revenues.  In theory, Congress could exercise 
discretion over nearly every action of the executive branch by choosing to 
withhold the necessary funds.  The Constitution imposes few limits on this 
discretion.9  In practice, however, Congress makes far less use of its fiscal 
discretion than it might.  During the past century, Congress has circumscribed 
its own discretionary decision-making over spending and taxation in a variety 
of ways, partly to better achieve a variety of goals and partly because of its 
own structural nature.  As a consequence, Congress’s institutional control over 
government tax and expenditure policy has shrunk. 
The difference in structure between the two political branches places 
Congress at an institutional disadvantage in its confrontations with the 
President.  The President, a single person, makes the ultimate decisions for the 
executive branch.  For Congress to take institutional action, it must obtain 
majority agreement from the members of each of two separate houses, and for 
some purposes, a supermajority.  Considerations of party interest, individual 
interest, or ideological difference may prevent a majority from taking action to 
assert an institutional interest.  Inaction by Congress may leave the field clear 
for the President to do as he or she pleases.  The burden of congressional 
inaction shifts in Congress’s favor, however, when a desired outcome requires 
enactment of new legislation.  Congress must act first for the activity to occur; 
the President’s wishes cannot prevail until it does so.  Fiscal matters that 
require periodic legislation, such as annual appropriation, give Congress its 
financial leverage.  Permanent or long-term fiscal legislation removes it. 
I. OVERVIEW OF BUDGET HISTORY 
In the early years of the Republic, Congress appropriated funds for 
executive branch departments on a line-item basis.10  An appropriation bill for 
 
8 Id. § 3302(b). 
9 For example, Congress cannot increase or decrease the President’s compensation 
during his term.  U.S. CONST., art. II, § 1, cl. 7.  Similarly, Congress cannot decrease the 
compensation of federal judges while they serve in office.  Id. at art. III, § 1.  Beyond 
explicit constitutional limits, some have thought the President’s Article II powers may imply 
a requirement that funds be made available to carry out the President’s powers, for example, 
for recognition of foreign ambassadors.  E.g., Kate Stith, Congress’ Power of the Purse, 97 
YALE L.J. 1343, 1350-51 (1988) (citing U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (presidential power to 
receive ambassadors); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (presidential power to make treaties)).  
For a discussion of functions that may continue without an annual appropriation of funds, 
see generally Alan L. Feld, Shutting Down the Government, 69 B.U. L. REV. 971 (1989). 
10 See, e.g., Act of July 10, 1797, ch. 17, 1 Stat. 534 (making additional appropriations 
for the support of government for the year 1797).  For an introduction to congressional 
budgeting activities from the founding of the Nation through the Johnson Administration, 
see generally Louis Fisher, Presidential Spending Discretion and Congressional Controls, 
37 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 135 (1972).  For a comprehensive overview of current budget 
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a department might have one line for salaries, another for office supplies, and 
another for rent.  In some years, Congress gave a department or agency limited 
authority to transfer funding from one line to another.  When it did not the 
funds had to be spent as appropriated.  Congress made appropriations one year 
at a time, in bills separate from substantive legislation.  Year to year increases 
tended to be modest.  Until the Civil War era, each house of Congress acted on 
revenue and spending bills through a single committee: Ways and Means in the 
House and Finance in the Senate.11  This facilitated coordination of federal 
revenue and spending, which approached a balanced budget norm except 
during wartime.12 
The Civil War added greatly to the size of the federal budget.  The 
government’s outlays in 1860 totaled $63 million.13  In 1867 they had grown to 
$358 million, more than five and a half times larger.14  To ease the burden on 
the fiscal committees, first the House and then the Senate divided authority 
over revenue from expenditure, retaining jurisdiction over taxes in the Ways 
and Means and Finance Committees and transferring appropriations 
jurisdiction to new committees.  A balanced budget remained the norm.  
Revenues covered peacetime expenditures and allowed for gradual pay down 
of debt accumulated during wartime.15  Some legislative committees, 
dissatisfied with tight spending controls, sought their own spending 
jurisdiction.16  Fragmentation of budget requests from the executive branch 
increased as well.  Some agencies submitted budget requests directly to the 
congressional committees without presidential review.17  The Treasury 
Department published an annual Book of Estimates that generally did not 
coordinate spending requests.18 
World War I similarly accounted for enormous growth in the size of the 
federal budget, from outlays of $713 million in 1916 to $6.36 billion in 1920, 
an almost ninefold increase.19  This growth called for greater coordination of 
funding requests and appropriations.  Internally, the House and Senate 
amended their rules to give their respective appropriations committees 
 
practices, see generally ALLEN SCHICK, THE FEDERAL BUDGET (3d ed. 2007). 
11 SCHICK, supra note 10, at 10-14. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. at 13. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. at 13-14. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, HISTORICAL 
TABLES, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2009, at 21, tbl. 1.1 
(2008) [hereinafter HISTORICAL TABLES], available at 
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy09/pdf/hist.pdf. 
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exclusive jurisdiction over spending legislation.20  More importantly, Congress 
passed the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, which  mandated that the 
President submit an annual budget to Congress, and created the Bureau of the 
Budget (now the Office of Management and Budget or “OMB”) to help gather 
information necessary for the budgeting process.21  Although the President’s 
recommendations did not have the force of law, the Act shifted the initiative 
for specification of spending priorities to the President. 
This change may not have had much effect on the dynamic between 
Congress and the President during the 1920s, when both institutions continued 
to pursue a balanced budget and reduction of the federal debt accumulated 
during the war years.  In the subsequent decades, however, both the Congress 
and the President pursued more expansive federal government objectives in 
connection with the Great Depression, World War II, and the Korean War, and 
continued an expanded governmental role into the 1950s and 1960s.  The 
presidential role shifted from limiting spending to proposing new spending 
programs.  When the Vietnam War created sharp divisions in the country and 
raised concerns as to controls over the executive branch, Congress sought to 
reassert its role in connection with the federal government’s money.  Members 
of Congress objected particularly to President Nixon’s impoundment of funds 
Congress had appropriated for particular projects, to Congress’s reliance on 
executive branch projections of spending needs and economic development, 
and to the persistence of budget deficits even as the Vietnam War phased 
down.22  Congress enacted the Congressional Budget and Impoundment 
Control Act of 1974 to redress the balance between the branches on money 
matters in Congress’s favor.23 
The 1974 Act required Congress to adopt an annual budget resolution to set 
revenue, spending, and debt totals, and to allocate spending among twenty 
functional categories.24  In so doing, Congress sought to coordinate better its 
spending and revenue raising functions.  It established new Budget 
Committees to set appropriate legislative targets. The Act created the 
Congressional Budget Office to provide financial estimates independent of the 
executive branch’s numbers.  It laid down budget procedures, under which no 
spending or tax legislation was in order until passage of a concurrent budget 
resolution.  It limited Presidential impoundment of appropriated funds.  These 
changes helped to equalize Congress’s institutional position on fiscal matters 
with the President. 
In subsequent decades, Congress experimented with additional budget 
 
20 SCHICK, supra note 10, at 13-14. 
21 Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, ch. 21, 42 Stat. 20 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 31 U.S.C.). 
22 SCHICK, supra note 10, at 17-18. 
23 Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 
Stat. 297 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 31 U.S.C.). 
24 Id. 
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constraints aimed at reduction of deficit spending.  The Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings Act threatened to sequester funding across the board when Congress 
failed to meet spending targets intended to help balance the budget.25  
Congress, however, found ways to avoid the sequester.  Later, Congress 
enacted pay-as-you-go requirements (“PAYGO”), matching increased 
spending or tax benefits with reductions in other outlays or increases in 
revenue.26  PAYGO expired in 2002.27  In 2006, the House enacted PAYGO 
requirements as part of its own rules.28  Neither the Senate nor the President, 
however, operates under a similar constraint. 
At present, discretion over expenditure of federal money combines 
congressional action with input from the President.  Formal inclusion of the 
President’s budget at the beginning of the process allows the executive branch, 
with the coordination provided by OMB, to frame budget issues.  Congress, 
however, must initiate action to appropriate funds.  When Congress makes a 
large, lump-sum appropriation or a permanent appropriation, the recipient can 
spend the money with no further action by Congress.  It has to that extent 
given up its discretionary role over the outlay.29 
II. THE SCOPE OF CONGRESSIONAL FISCAL DISCRETION 
Congress’s control over the federal government’s funds concerns four 
related areas: expenditures, impoundments, debt, and taxes. 
A. Expenditures 
When Congress enacts appropriations or levies taxes for short periods, it can 
review quickly the effects of the legislation, including the executive branch’s 
actions in making the expenditure.  For much of the current fiscal landscape, 
however, Congress has enacted relatively permanent law.  Appropriations for 
entitlements, for example, provide the authority to spend such amounts as 
needed to meet the claims for social security or Medicare payments.30  Such 
 
25 Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act (Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act) 
of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99 Stat. 1038 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 31 
U.S.C.). 
26 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 31 U.S.C.). 
27 2 U.S.C. § 902(a) (2006). 
28 H.R. Res. 6, 110th Cong. § 405 (2007) (enacted) (amending clause 10, Rule XXI of 
the Rules of the House of Representatives). 
29 Budget rules may create their own incentives and distortions; that is beyond the scope 
of this Essay.  See generally Tim Westmoreland, Standard Errors: How Budget Rules 
Distort Lawmaking, 96 GEO. L.J. 1555 (2007); George K. Yin, Temporary-Effect 
Legislation, Political Accountability, and Fiscal Restraint, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1172102. 
30 42 U.S.C. § 301 (2000) (authorizing appropriations sufficient to cover each state’s 
social security commitments); id. § 1396 (authorizing appropriations sufficient to allow each 
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permanent fiscal legislation limits Congress’s ability to review and change 
priorities through the appropriation process.  New legislation can alter any law 
currently on the books.  In practice, however, change must pass through the 
many steps for enactment of legislation, obtaining the separate approval of 
each house and the President, rendering change difficult to achieve.  The 
difficulty increases when the change reduces benefits or increases burdens, 
encouraging the affected parties to mobilize their opposition. 
The federal government in 2007 had fiscal outlays of about $2.7 trillion, 
representing almost twenty percent of gross domestic product.31  As a practical 
matter, the 110th Congress controlled only a small part of it.  The Budget 
Enforcement Act of 1990 categorizes almost sixty-two percent of the outlays 
as mandatory – money over which Congress exercised no discretion.32  The 
largest component of the mandatory category consists of entitlement programs, 
such as social security, Medicaid and veterans pensions.33  The remainder of 
the budget divides between defense spending and all other discretionary 
spending.34 
Within these latter two categories Congress specifies the uses to which the 
funds will apply.  The amount of detail varies widely.  Some categories contain 
such breadth that the President or the executive agency makes the real choices 
of how to spend the funds.  Other mechanisms also transfer the discretion over 
use of the funds from Congress to the President or the agency.  Some 
appropriations grant an administrator express authority to shift funds from one 
category to another.35  Congress may create exceptions to the Miscellaneous 
Receipts Act and allow an agency to retain funds from outside sources.36  
Thus, Congress allows military medical facilities to retain health care 
recoveries from third-party payers for medical treatment to military 
personnel.37  Congress has established several revolving funds in which, after 
an initial appropriation, the agency may replenish the fund with related 
receipts.38  In the case of the CIA, sums made available to the Agency contain 
 
state to provide medical assistance for qualifying families and individuals). 
31 HISTORICAL TABLES, supra note 19, at 27, tbl 1.3. 
32 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE 
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2009, at 25-26 (2008), available at 
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy09/pdf/budget/outlook.pdf (observing that fifty-three 
percent of funding is “mandatory” and nine percent is interest payments under the standards 
set forth by the 1990 Act). 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1538 (2006) (National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration); 50 U.S.C. § 403-4(d) (2000) (Director of National Intelligence). 
36 31 U.S.C. § 3302(b) (2000). 
37 10 U.S.C. § 1095(g) (2006). 
38 42 U.S.C. § 10601 (2000) (Crime Victims Fund); 15 U.S.C. § 2514(b) (2006) 
(appropriating funds for federal agencies to use electric and hybrid vehicles). 
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virtually no limitations.39 
Congressional committees can review how an agency has used appropriated 
funds, but Congress cannot retrieve funds the agency has spent or committed.  
Frequently, the agency and the relevant committees are continuing players, and 
the threat of reduced funding in subsequent years may constrain agency action 
that strays too far from congressional intent.  Thus, in some cases formal 
discretion over spending devolves from Congress to the executive agency with 
continuing informal oversight from one or more congressional committees.  
The threat the committees hold concerns the power to appropriate funds for the 
future. 
Within Congress, the House traditionally originates the appropriations 
bills.40  In a classic study, Richard Fenno analyzed the power of the House 
Appropriations Committee (“HAC”).41  In the years he studied, the HAC 
formulated the annual appropriations legislation after detailed study, 
discussion, and compromise within its subcommittees.42  The bills passed the 
House with little change.  The Senate accepted the House bills as its starting 
point and offered amendments, and the President signed the bills.  Generally, 
the final legislation closely resembled the version crafted by HAC. 
Fenno attributed acceptance of the HAC appropriations bills to a number of 
factors.  The committee members worked hard in reviewing requests from 
federal agencies and acquired considerable expertise in the process, thus 
gaining the respect of nonmembers.  Members maintained a common general 
objective, limiting claims on the federal fisc.  Although one party remained in 
control of Congress and established its spending priorities for most of the years 
Fenno studied, the HAC acted in a bipartisan fashion and incorporated 
amendments and proposals from members of the other party.  Minority party 
members of the Committee did not feel shut out of the process, and the 
Committee members presented a common front to the House in support of the 
legislation reported from the Committee.  A common esprit, coupled with an 
understanding that cooperation enhanced their authority, limited dissent 
outside the HAC: non-members rarely challenged HAC’s determinations.  
Further, Committee membership was very stable.43  As a result of all these 
factors, Fenno concluded that the HAC product received only limited revisions 
 
39 50 U.S.C. § 403-1(c) (2000).  A taxpayer has no standing to require reporting of 
Agency receipts and expenditures.  United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 170 (1974). 
40 The Constitution requires that bills for the raising of revenue originate in the House, 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1, but the Constitution contains no origination requirements for 
other money bills. 
41 RICHARD F. FENNO, JR., THE POWER OF THE PURSE: APPROPRIATIONS POLITICS IN 
CONGRESS (1966); see also Richard F. Fenno, Jr., The House Appropriations Committee as 
a Political System: The Problem of Integration, 56 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 310, 310-24 (1962). 
42 FENNO, supra note 41, at 127-90. 
43 Id. at 82-95.  Committee membership was usually awarded to senior members from 
safe districts.  As such, Committee members may remain on the Committee for many terms.  
Id. 
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in the balance of the legislative process.44 
By the end of the twentieth century, the institutional fabric of the HAC had 
unraveled.45  Republican control of the House after 1994 emphasized increased 
partisanship and excluded minority party members from decision-making.  
Changes in rules for membership on the HAC and greater insistence by the 
House leadership on setting the Committee’s agenda further eroded the 
cohesive relationships that had helped the Committee function.46  As a 
consequence, the Committee lost its capacity to set the expenditure agenda for 
the House.47  The executive branch and the Senate filled parts of the resulting 
vacuum.  Conflict between Congress and the President led to increasing use of 
continuing resolutions to keep government functions running at their previous 
level, an abdication of the exercise of choice in making expenditures.48 
In sum, congressional control over federal expenditures has been weakened 
in several ways.  Permanent appropriations constrain Congress’s ability to 
review and change priorities through the appropriation process.  Explicit grants 
of discretion to alter or suspend congressional directives for the use of funds 
transfer the ability to make choices to executive agencies.  Within Congress, 
the HAC no longer sets the expenditure agenda as it formerly did – allowing 
the executive branch to fill part of the resulting vacuum.  Conflict between 
Congress and the President increasingly result in the use of continuing 
resolutions rather than new appropriations.  In short, Congress has given up 
some of its power to make expenditure choices. 
B. Impoundment 
Most disagreements over expenditures involve spending priorities of the 
executive branch that Congress does not fully endorse.  Occasionally, however, 
Congress appropriates funds the President does not wish to spend, whether as 
part of a general budget-tightening policy, or for reasons related to the 
particular purpose for the funds.  Presidential impoundment of funds became a 
major source of friction in the post-Vietnam War era.  Congress passed the 
1974 budget legislation partly in response to President Nixon withholding 
funds Congress had appropriated.49  The 1974 Act created procedures that 
 
44 Id. at 676-78. 
45 See generally Joshua Gordon, The (Dis)Integration of the House Appropriations 
Committee: Revisiting The Power of the Purse in a Partisan Era 3-7 (Aug. 28, 2003) 
(unpublished manuscript presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science 
Association) (arguing that the HAC can no longer fulfill its historic role because of changes 
in the partisan atmosphere), available at 
http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/6/4/6/7/p64673_index.ht
ml. 
46 Id. at 12-22. 
47 Id. at 23-27. 
48 SCHICK, supra note 10, at 6-7, 260-63. 
49 See supra notes 22-24, and accompanying text. 
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govern an agency’s failure to spend money Congress appropriated.50  It divides 
this category into deferrals and rescissions.51  The President may defer an 
expenditure for the limited reasons listed in the statute – such as to provide for 
savings made possible by external changes – by reporting the deferral to 
Congress.  Other decisions not to spend funds constitute rescissions.  The 
President may propose a rescission of an appropriation, which starts a forty-
five-day clock for Congress to take action on the proposal.  Congressional 
failure to act requires that the President release the funds for expenditure.  
Congress may also initiate rescissions.  This process keeps Congress directly 
involved in the contemplated expenditure and does not leave discretion with 
the executive branch. 
After a small number of initial disagreements between Congress and the 
President, this process has operated relatively smoothly.52 
C. Debt 
Congress does not exercise effective control over the federal debt outside 
the direct appropriation and taxation processes.  It has provided a general 
authorization to the Secretary of the Treasury to borrow on the credit of the 
United States as necessary for expenditures authorized by law.53 
In addition, Congress has established a limit on the total amount of debt the 
federal government can incur.54  But whenever the debt grows to near that 
amount, Congress simply increases the limit.55  In 1979, after several 
contentious votes on raising the debt limit, the House amended its standing 
rules to increase the debt limit automatically whenever the concurrent budget 
resolution sets a new limit.56  Deeming the House to have approved the new 
ceiling when it approved the budget resolution, the Rule provides for 
enrollment of a bill automatically setting the debt limit at the new level and 
sending it to the Senate without a separate vote.57  In effect, this approach 
treats the debt limit as a dependent variable, determined by receipts and 
disbursements, rather than as a separate control on federal government 
spending. 
 
50 Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 
Stat. 297, Title X (codified as amended in scattered sections of 31 U.S.C.). 
51 Id. 
52 SCHICK, supra note 10, at 120, 284-86. 
53 31 U.S.C. §§ 3102-03 (2000). 
54 Id. § 3101(b). 
55 Id.  Congress most recently increased the debt limit to $9.815 trillion.  31 U.S.C.A. § 
3101(b) (West 2003 & Supp. 2008).  For a discussion of proposals to make the debt limit 
statute more effective, see generally Anita S. Krishnakumar, In Defense of the Debt Limit 
Statute, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 135 (2005). 
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D. Taxes 
The individual income tax constitutes the largest single source of federal 
government revenues.  For 2007 it amounted to slightly more than $1.1 trillion, 
representing about 45.3% of all federal revenues and 8.5% of the U.S. gross 
domestic product.58  The relative role of the corporate income tax has declined 
in recent years, but for 2007 it accounted for nearly $370 billion in revenue, 
14.4% of all federal revenues and 2.7% of GDP.59 
In the first two-and-a-half decades of the individual income tax, from 1913 
through 1938, Congress enacted a complete revenue act about once every two 
years.  In 1939, Congress codified federal taxes, in effect rendering them a 
permanent part of the law that required no periodic reenactment.60  While 
Congress occasionally has made major changes in these levies, most notably in 
the World War II era, it generally has left the basic structure in place and has 
dealt with details of the income taxes.  The bulk of this tax revenue 
consistently has come from wage and personal service income.  In effect, the 
individual and corporate income taxes have continued from year to year as a 
permanent fixture of the federal government without further congressional 
action. 
Permanent legislation, as manifested in codification of the tax law, places 
the burden of changing or repealing the law on the proponents of change or 
repeal, rather than on those who want to continue the tax.  Imposition of a tax 
without periodic congressional action allows members of Congress to disclaim 
responsibility for the levy.  Rhetoric in recent Republican-controlled 
Congresses, for example, attacked the “IRS Code,” effectively disclaiming 
responsibility for it – as if the Agency, not Congress, had created the tax.61  
Codification hands the executive branch an assured source of revenue until 
new legislation by Congress – either with the President’s approval or by 
supermajorities – makes a change.  The Founding Fathers understood that the 
power to impose taxes was an important curb on executive power.62  A 
permanent tax guarantees the executive branch vast resources without further 
congressional revenue-raising action.  It thereby reduces congressional power 
and with it various checks against the executive branch. 
A permanent tax also facilitates the creation of tax expenditures – special 
tax-sparing provisions targeted to particular transactions or entities.63  Once 
such provisions become embedded in the income tax, they fall outside the 
 
58 HISTORICAL TABLES, supra note 19, at 31-35, tbls. 2.1, 2.2 & 2.3. 
59 Id. 
60 Internal Revenue Code of 1939, Public L. No. 76-1, 53 Stat. 1 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). 
61 E.g., 148 CONG. REC. 15487 (2002) (statement of Sen. Gramm). 
62 THE FEDERALIST NO. 58 (James Madison), supra note 1, at 394. 
63 For a list of current tax expenditures, see JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, ESTIMATES OF 
FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2008-2012, at 48-76 (2008), available at 
http://www.house.gov/jct/s-2-08.pdf. 
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usual expenditure review and can avoid all congressional review for long 
periods of time. 
Congress occasionally enacts tax provisions with an expiration date or 
“sunset.”  These provisions require new legislative votes to remain in 
existence.  Scholars disagree as to the desirability of sunsetting tax provisions.  
On the one hand, a public choice critique holds that the periodic reenactment 
of a tax benefit merely creates multiple opportunities for legislators to extract 
“rents” from the affected industries.64  On the other hand, periodic reenactment 
arguably allows for tighter fiscal control over tax expenditures.65  Periodic 
review and reenactment of the entire income tax has not been debated or 
studied.  It would, however, require legislators to take responsibility for the tax 
and perhaps invite closer scrutiny of federal use of tax revenues. 
CONCLUSION 
Three decades ago, Charles Black examined Congress’s difficulty in 
advancing its institutional concerns by posing the following collective action 
problem: Congress could trump the President’s veto power if it were prepared 
to override every exercise of the veto without regard to the merits of each 
issue.66  If it did so, if everyone expected that Congress would always override 
a veto, Congress would more often have its own way when it disagrees with 
the President.  Strengthening Congress in this way would enhance its role over 
the long term.  Each member would gain some additional measure of power.  
Yet Congress does not behave in this way and the presidential veto has become 
a formidable weapon in his arsenal. 
Similarly, in connection with spending decisions, the interests of individual 
members often vary in the short term from any institutional objective.  Party 
divisions enlarge this divergence.  Members of the President’s party may find 
themselves sharing more of their current spending priorities with the President, 
rather than with other members of Congress.  If we add the claims of interests 
outside the legislative four walls, the institutional claims on each member’s 
behavior have ample competition. 
Compared with the more hierarchical executive branch, the task within 
Congress of coordinating action to achieve institutional objectives involves far 
greater difficulty.  Congress’s power to direct spending priorities on a 
continuing basis reaches its peak if it must act to authorize the expenditure.  
Permanent appropriations or tax measures leave the decision-making field 
largely to the executive branch. 
Fenno’s analysis of the HAC offers some steps for Congress to assert 
 
64 Rebecca M. Kysar, The Sun Also Rises: The Political Economy of Sunset Provisions in 
the Tax Code, 40 GA. L. REV. 335, 339 (2006). 
65 Yin, supra note 29 (manuscript at 14-15). 
66 CHARLES L. BLACK & BOB ECKHARDT, TIDES OF POWER: CONVERSATIONS ON THE 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 23 (1976). 
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enhanced exercise of discretion as compared with the executive branch.67  
First, a significant majority must present a unified front in support of any 
spending plan.  Only through bipartisan deliberation and the give and take of 
compromise can Congress achieve such unity on a regular basis.  Second, 
Congress must be prepared to act periodically on measures that matter in the 
fiscal world, leaving as little as practicable to permanent legislation.  By doing 
so, perhaps Congress can reestablish its role in checking executive spending – 
and enhance the power of the purse. 
 
 
67 See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text. 
